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The post-9/11 world has provided an excellent environment
to examine the reach of presidential power and the constraints
placed upon it by Congress and the courts. Professor Jack
Goldsmith argues that controversial Bush-era detention
practices were “altered and blessed” by the Congress and courts
“in ways that Barack Obama—seized of the responsibilities of
the presidency—found impossible to resist.” If there was such a
“blessing,” it was clearly in disguise. Notwithstanding, this
piece largely endorses Jack Goldsmith’s principal theory in his
recent book Power and Constraint, and offers several other
reasons for the erosion of executive authority in the area of
detention issues. It also addresses this author’s view that the
War on Terror is not a “War Without End” at all, thereby
limiting the executive’s supposed “indefinite” ability to detain
enemy combatants.
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The post-9/11 world and our War on Terror have provided an
excellent backdrop to examine the breadth and scope of presidential
power and the degree to which the Constitution, external influences,
and constraints within the executive branch restrain this authority.
Professor Jack Goldsmith describes the role that Congress and the
courts played in ultimately paving the way for President Obama to
endorse previously controversial Bush-era detention practices in his
new book Power and Constraint. 1 He argues that “Congress and [the]
courts pushed back harder against the presidency than in previous
wars, in the process vetting, altering and ultimately blessing
[President Bush’s] core counterterrorism policies.” 2 Goldsmith claims
that by 2009 the policies had been “altered and blessed in ways that
Barack Obama—seized of the responsibilities of the presidency—found
impossible to resist.” 3 Having held a front-row seat on this issue inside
of the government during the challenging years from 2004–2009 and
through the initial transition to President Obama’s team, if there was
a “blessing,” it was clearly in disguise. This short piece will largely
endorse Jack Goldsmith’s principal theory and offer several other
reasons for this erosion of executive authority in the specific area of
detention issues. It will also address this author’s view that the War
on Terror is not a “War Without End” at all, thereby limiting the
executive’s supposed “indefinite” ability to detain enemy combatants.

I.

Jack Goldsmith’s Accountable Presidency

Professor Goldsmith’s new book Power and Constraint presents
excellent insights into the extremely powerful role Congress and the
courts played in shaping President Bush’s detention policies from
2004–2009. The book also helps to explain how Guantanamo Bay
remains open today. Two very different Presidential hopefuls,
Senators John McCain and Barack Obama, both agreed in the 2008
election that it was imperative to our national security that we close
the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. 4 Yet, even after the 2012

1.

JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012).

2.

Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency
After 9/11, LAWFARE, http://lawfareblog.com/power-and-constraint-the
-accountable-presidency-after-911/(Mar. 12, 2012, 7:59 AM) (emphasis
added) (describing Power and Constraint).

3.

Id. (emphasis added).

4.

Peter Finn, Guantanamo Closure Called Obama Priority, WASH. POST,
(Nov. 12, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/art
icle/2008/11/11/AR2008111102865.html; The Candidates on Military
Tribunals and Guantanamo Bay, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
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election, Guantanamo Bay is not only open, but more durable than
ever.
Under Goldsmith’s theory, Congress and the courts shaped and
ultimately “blessed” these policies into something that President
Obama could endorse. This author would argue the Supreme Court’s
blessings came in a round-about way; however, with every ruling
against the Bush Administration on detention policy, there was some
element of the policy the Court quietly endorsed.
For example, in the early seminal detention case of Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court determined that Hamdi, a U.S. citizen,
had the right to challenge his enemy-combatant status before a
neutral decision-maker. 5 In the Court’s opinion, Justice O’Connor
suggested that the proceedings used to determine status for prisoners
of war set in the Army Field Manual 6 would have been sufficient in
this case to satisfy this requirement. 7 This suggestion became the
impetus for the more structured Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs), which were much closer to these Army Field Manual
provisions. 8 While the Supreme Court effectively ruled against the
Bush Administration in this case, Justice O’Connor determined that
the president could detain a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant, 9 and
supported his underlying legal framework authorizing detention under
the laws of war.
The 2006 Hamdan case 10 was another example of the Supreme
Court’s quiet support for the Administration’s law of war framework.
The Supreme Court ruled against the Bush Administration in
determining that the President’s Military Order on Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War on
(Aug. 24, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/world/candidates-military-tribun
als-guantanamo-bay/p14751.
5.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).

6.

See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED
PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES, ARMY
REGULATION 190-8, at 1–19 (1997), available at http://www.au.af.
mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/ar190-8.pdf. These proceedings are commonly
known as “Article 5” Tribunals, taken from Geneva Convention (III).
An “Article 5” Tribunal is used to determine whether an enemy prisoner
is a prisoner of war when status is in doubt. Id. at 2.

7.

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (stating that “military regulations already
provide for such process in related instances, dictating that tribunals be
made available to determine the status of enemy detainees who assert
prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Convention”).

8.

See Department of Defense, Combatant Status Review Tribunal
Summary (Feb. 10, 2009) [hereinafter DoD, CSRT Summary], available
at http://www. defense.gov/news/csrtsummary.pdf.

9.

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.

10.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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Terrorism, which established military commissions did not comply
with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 11 and that the
charge of conspiracy could not be tried under the laws of war. 12
However, the Court did acknowledge that when the Authorization for
Use of Military Force (AUMF) activated the president’s war powers,
this included the authority to convene military commissions. 13 The
Court went on to explain, in significant detail and using historical
war-time cases and authorities, how the military commissions
established by the president’s military order, as constituted, violated
the international law of war (indicating that the commissions would
be legitimate if they better complied with the Geneva Conventions). 14
This was additional quiet support for the Bush Administration’s
position that the United States was in an armed conflict and that the
law of war framework was appropriate. While the Supreme Court
generated front-page news by repeatedly striking down aspects of the
Bush Administration’s policy, it quietly endorsed two critical
centerpieces of that policy—law of war detention and the use of
military commissions to try enemy combatants.
Congress was more vocal in its support for the Bush
Administration’s policies than the Supreme Court. While there was
certainly criticism coming from some members, 15 as a whole Congress
did try and provide the authority the administration needed to
continue law of war detention and military commissions. First in 2005
following the Hamdi decision, Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act, 16 which carried a provision stripping detainees at

11.

Military Order on Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War on Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831 (Nov. 13, 2001);
see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 633–34. The Court determined that
Common Article 3 of all four Geneva Conventions, the basic level of
treatment afforded to individuals involved in non-international armed
conflicts, was applicable to our conflict with al-Qaeda, rather than the
full Geneva Conventions, as al-Qaeda was not a “High Contracting
Party” to the Geneva Conventions. Id.

12.

Id. at 610.

13.

See id. at 594–95.

14.

See id. at 628–29, 632.

15.

See, e.g., Albert R. Hunt, Bush’s Terror Overreach Becomes ‘New
Normal’ Under Obama, BLOOMBERG, (May 27, 2012), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-27/bush-s-terror-overreach-becomes-newnormal-under-obama.html

16.

See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)
(prohibiting the “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”
of detainees and eliminating federal court jurisdiction over detainees
from Guantanamo Bay challenging the legality of their detention in
court).
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Guantanamo of any habeas corpus rights. 17 Later, Congress passed
the Military Commissions Act of 2006 18 to satisfy the Hamdan Court’s
ruling that military commissions were not a “regularly constituted
court” under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. Congress
later supported the Obama Administration with the Military
Commissions Act of 2009, 19 which added a few rights to individual
subject to military commissions in line with the Obama
Administration’s policies. 20 As the Supreme Court quietly supported
the executive’s policies, and Congress overtly supported them, it
became clear that the executive branch needed the support of the
other two branches in order to accomplish its own detention policies.
(Reasonable minds can differ as to whether this shows a weak
executive or a strong system of checks and balances.)
Apart from the role of the courts and Congress, it was actors
within the executive branch that played a large role in moving
policies forward. Several colleagues in key political assignments 21
advocated for changes from within the Bush Administration to make
the detention policies more sustainable. Career government officials,
who served in both the Bush and Obama Administrations, also
focused on positive policy changes and over time became invested in
the decisions and recommendations they had made. These personnel
were a strong factor in continuing the policies across the two
administrations. While there is a perception on the outside that U.S.
detention policy was constructed and defended by hard core President
Bush political appointees, the reality is that career officials
throughout the departments played a large role in the evolution of
these policies and many were ultimately convinced by the time the
Obama Administration arrived that the policies had reached a decent
balance between respect for human rights and due process and the
need to protect our national security or were the least worst option. 22
17.

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004). The provision in the
Detainee Treatment Act was designed to strip the statutory habeas
corpus granted to Hamdi by the Supreme Court in the Hamdi decision.

18.

Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950w (2006).

19.

Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a – 950t (2009).

20.

See generally id. (removing, for example, the definition of “Unlawful”
and “Lawful Enemy Combatants”).

21.

John Bellinger, National Security Council and State Department Legal
Advisor, Matt Waxman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Detainee Affairs, and Pierre Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War
Crimes Issues are good examples.

22.

Views did differ broadly on the question of whether or not to close the
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay by either moving the detainees to
the United States or transferring or releasing the remaining detainees to
their home countries or willing third countries. There was much more
generalized consensus on the law of war framework for detention and
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Those who remained in place in the Obama Administration provided
continuity of policy. As a career civil servant and reserve Navy JAG
myself who worked the detainee issue at the National Security
Council (NSC) staff, State Department and Defense Department
during both Administrations, my own personal motivation for
improving our detention policies into something sustainable was nonpartisan. It stemmed from a view that military detention must remain
a legitimate tool for battlefield commanders in times of war. It helps
to keep our enemies off of the battlefield and helps us to gather timely
intelligence—both of which are essential to our national security.
As a result of these personnel factors, President Obama’s initial
detainee-review process reached very similar outcomes as the final
reviews under the Bush Administration. “High-threat detainees” were
still classified as high threat, “medium-threat detainees” were still
medium threat, and so on. For example, Yemenis of varying threat
levels were still too dangerous to send to Yemen. Now, four years into
the Obama Administration, only about eighty additional detainees
have been transferred or released (approximately fifty of whom were
already slated for the same disposition at the time of the transition)
in contrast with more than 500 during the Bush Administration. 23
This was a key area of continuity.
Lastly, a key contributing factor to the continuity of policy across
the administrations was the fact that most of the key steps needed
had already been taken by the Bush Administration. Common Article
3 was applicable as a matter of law and policy to all Department of
Defense detainees wherever they were held. 24 Military commissions
had already been regularized through the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 and various aspects of the process improved upon, such as
hearsay evidence, confrontation, and the use of coercive statements. 25
Key allies were now working more closely with the Bush
Administration on the detainee issue in areas like Afghanistan.
Through the CSRT and Administration Review Board procedures,
the threat level of these detainees. See Interview with Christopher
Boucek, Associate, Carnegie Endowment, Middle East Program (Nov.
24, 2008), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2008/11/24
/closing-guantanamo-bay-options-and-decisions/z5j (discussing the basic
options for Guantanamo Bay closure).
23.

Human Rights First, Fact Sheet, Guantanamo by the Numbers, (Sept.
10, 2012), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/U
SLS-Fact-Sheet-Gitmo-Numbers.pdf.

24.

Department of Defense Directive No. 2310.01E, The Department of
Defense Detainee Program, ¶ 4.2.

25.

Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948b(a), 949a(b) (2006)
(establishing procedures for the use of military commissions, specifically
regarding an accused’s right to confront allegations against him,
evidence obtained through coercion, and hearsay evidence).
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more than two-thirds of the detainee population had already left
Guantanamo Bay. 26 All of these steps taken together set the stage for
President Obama to adopt the policies of his predecessor, despite the
campaign promises that both he and presidential hopeful John
McCain made.

II. Eroding Executive Authority Through the
National Security Staffing Process
The National Security Staff (NSS) decision-making process on the
detention issue, through its desire for consensus decisions, also
contributed to a weakening of executive authority on detention issues
during this critical period. The National Security Act of 1947 was the
original impetus for today’s NSS and NSS decision-making process,
which is an interagency coordination process. 27 During both the Bush
and Obama Administrations, this interagency coordination process
was used to tackle the detainee issue. 28
The National Security Act was originally designed to improve
coordination among the various military services and the other arms
of national security, such as the intelligence community, 29 and
continues to perform this function today, although it has broadened
26.

See DoD, CSRT Summary, supra note 8 (summarizing CSRT statistics);
Press Release, Department of Defense, Guantanamo Bay 2006
Administrative Review Board Results Announced, (Mar. 6, 2007),
available at http:// www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10
582 (showing an example of the routine departures from Guantanamo
Bay due to ARBs); Guantanomo Ten Years On: Facts and Figures,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/features/guantanamofacts-figures (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (noting that roughly 600 of the
779 detainees that have been held at Guantanamo Bay since the
September 11, 2001 attacks have been released, with another 86
currently approved for transfer).

27.

See National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1947); National
Security Act of 1947, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NationalSecurityAct (last
visited Jan. 10, 2013).

28.

See National Security Presidential Directive 1, Organization of the
National Security Council System, Feb. 13, 2001 [hereinafter NSPD-1];
Presidential Policy Directive 1, Organization of the National Security
Council System, Feb. 13, 2009 [hereinafter PPD-1]. Presidents Bush and
Obama both set forth the same basic three-level staffing process that
has been in place since 1989. During the Bush Administration, the
NSPD-1 set forth six specific Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs),
and originally, the detainee issue was technically formed under the
Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations PCC, although
it ultimately became the Detainee PCC. See NSPD-1, supra note 28
(listing the established PCCs).

29.

National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 401.
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its scope to a relatively wide array of subjects. Today’s NSS decisionmaking process is comprised of three levels of authority. 30
The first level of the process was known in the Bush
Administration as the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) 31 and
now in the Obama Administration as the Interagency Policy
Committee (IPC). 32 During the Bush Administration, this interagency
coordination process was increasingly used to address challenges of the
detainee issue starting in 2004 and remained focused on this issue
throughout the remainder of President Bush’s term and the Obama
Administration. For each meeting, a select group of representatives
from the National Security Council staff, the Defense, State, Justice,
and Homeland Security Departments, and the intelligence community
would meet regularly at the Assistant Secretary or Deputy Assistant
Secretary level at the White House to address the detainee issue.
The PCC and IPC participants would serve up key issues for
resolution or approval at the second level, the Deputies Committee
(DC), 33 which was a group of delegated Deputy or Under Secretaries
of the various departments, or their designees (often department
General Counsels). The DC would consider the recommendations
made by the PCC or IPC but struggled to reach consensus on any
particular course of action. When this happened, there were three
options: (1) the Deputy National Security Advisor could adjudicate or
referee among the agencies to work out differences; (2) the DC could
send the PCC or IPC back to “work the issue further” or develop new
recommendations; or, (3) if the DC was satisfied that sufficient work
had been done and the issue was ready, it would send it up to the

30.

See NSPD-1, supra note 28; PPD-1, supra note 28. In January 2010,
President Obama announced that the National Security Council (NSC)
would be renamed the National Security Staff (NSS) and would merge
the former National Security Council and the Homeland Security
Council. See Laura Rozen, Introducing the National Security Staff,
POLITICO,j(Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.politico.com/blogs/laurarozen/01
10/Introducing_the_National_Security_Staff.html. As a result, today
the President Bush- and before-era NSC staff is now known as the NSS.
Id.

31.

See NSPD-1, supra note 28 (stating that “[t]he NSC/PCCs shall be the
main day-to-day fora for international coordination of national security
policy”).

32.

See PPD-1, supra note 28 (also stating that “[t]he NSC/PCCs shall be
the main day-to-day fora for international coordination of national
security policy”).

33.

See NSPD-1, supra note 28 (“[The DC] will also continue to serve as the
senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues
affecting national security.”); PPD-1, supra note 28 (“[The NSC DC]
shall review and monitor the work of the NSC interagency process
. . . .”).
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third and final level, the Principals Committee (PC). 34 Decisions
could be taken at the PC or DC level based on consensus or if the
national security advisor or deputy national security advisor made the
decision. Ultimately, there was recourse to the National Security
Council, if needed, comprised of the president and his cabinet. 35
Detainee issues made their way up and down the full range of
meetings, but due to the contentious nature of the issue, rarely
resulted in consensus decisions. The NSS decision-making process
aims to achieve better “coordination” of interagency policy issues. 36
As a result, the National Security Advisor and Deputy National
Security Advisors did not generally act decisively for fear of shutting
down the views of a major department or entity in the national
security arena. The President or the full National Security Council
would be necessary to make major changes. 37
The purpose of this section is not to provide a bogged down
analysis of the staff and decision-making process working on national
security issues, but to take the position that the detainee issue was
one which was not easily served by the existing process: it often got
caught in a giant loop. The PCC/IPC would typically generate work
for the DC, which would fail to reach consensus on the
recommendations and send it back again for a do over or
modification. If the DC did forward an issue to the PC, it was often
with a split recommendation involving key agencies on opposite sides
of the recommendation. Favoring consensus over hard choices, the PC
and DC generally continued to send work back down the PCC/IPC
level, often failing to make the hard decisions needed to break the
logjam on Guantanamo Bay or other detainee issues. As a result, the
courts, Congress, and other external actors had more time and space
to weigh into, and wade into, the detainee issue in the way Professor
Goldsmith depicts.
As a strong believer of the need for a strong interagency
coordination mechanism, this is not meant to be a criticism of the
U.S. government. In fairness, a great deal of credit should be given to
both administrations for assembling such high-level teams to examine
an issue as small as the detainee issue, particularly given that few
people in the government were raising their hands enthusiastically to
take the issue on. Furthermore, any decisive course of action was
34.

See NSPD-1, supra note 28 (“[The PC is the] senior interagency forum
for consideration of policy issues affecting National Security. . . .”);
PPD-1, supra note 28.

35.

See National Security Council, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.white
house.gov/administration/eop/nsc (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).

36.

See text accompanying notes 28 and 31.

37.

See National Security Council, supra note 35 (listing the regular
attendees of NSC meetings).
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truly difficult, with staunchly opposing teams on either side of the
following types of issues: (1) whether to close Guantanamo Bay or
affirmatively stand behind its existence;(2) whether to shutter or
overhaul military commissions; (3) whether to transfer back mediumand high-threat individuals into uncertain security environments or
leave them in detention; and (4) whether to scrap military detention
altogether and rely solely on Article III courts. 38 Without extremely
decisive leadership at the top ruling in favor of one side or against
another, the NSS decision-making process was unable to address these
contentious issues early on and then back action with solid messaging
and commitment to the policies adopted. Instead, a continued
evaluation and re-evaluation of the same issues in both
administrations resulted in a weaker executive as the Supreme Court
and Congress whittled away executive authority by acting in areas
where the president could have acted by exercising his national
security authorities.
One could argue that the Bush Administration did act decisively
by establishing a detention facility at Guantanamo Bay (rather than
keeping the detainees closer to the battlefield in Afghanistan) and in
deciding that Article 5 tribunals would not be used for members of alQaeda or the Taliban—two rapid decisions that were challenged
directly for years to come. Perhaps this had a chilling effect on the
desire of the Bush Administration to remain decisive on detainee
issues in following years. It became easy to predict the public reaction
to the status quo. It is likewise possible that the Obama
Administration was able to blame the former administration for the
ills of Guantanamo long enough that the impetus to act decisively
was less critical. Unfortunately, that time the administration lost
ended up costing the president the ability to close Guantanamo Bay
during the only window of time possible—the first four months of his
administration, before the political opposition began to build.
Whatever the reasons on either side, the NSS decision-making
processes as they existed were not nimble enough to force decisive or
bold changes. And while extremely hardworking staff-level and senior
leadership wrestled with these very difficult issues week after week,
often making slow but steady improvements to the overall process,
the bleeding on Guantanamo Bay continued from outside, from
abroad, and from the other branches of government. The net result
was a series of national security laws and policies that did not all
originate with the executive and had the practical effect of eroding
executive authority.
38.

See generally Sarah Mendelson, Closing Guantanamo: From Bumper
Sticker to Blueprint (Ctr. for Strategic Int’l Stud., Draft Rep’t, (July 15,
2008), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080715_draft_
csis_wg_gtmo.pdf (describing the various options available for the
Obama Administration in moving forward on Guantanamo).
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III. The “War on Terror” is Not a “War Without
End”
There is no such thing as a war without end. All wars come to an
end, even though it may be hard to predict when that end will be.
When President Woodrow Wilson first coined the phrase “the war to
end all wars” when speaking to Congress about World War I 39 or
when President Roosevelt referred to World War II as the “Long
War,” 40 neither president could easily predict when the war would
end. At some level of destruction, some level of defeat, or some level
of fighting fatigue, one way or another, wars end. In a classic stateon-state conflict, the typical ways to end a war are through a peace
treaty, defeat, or surrender. 41 World War I ended with the Treaty of
Versailles, 42 while World War II ended with Germany and Japan
surrendering. 43 Generally, upon conclusion of the war, it is presumed
that most, if not all, members of the country’s regular armed forces
will lay down their arms and comply with the outcome of the war.
This, however, is not always the case. Many modern conflicts have
evolved into protracted insurgencies when non-government controlled
forces are not ready to give up the fight, and are able to continue to
fight. The recent example of Iraq is illustrative, as Iraqi insurgents
have continued to destabilize the country long after the official war
has ended. 44 Northern Ireland is another example of a country where
the fighting continued long after the peace process was in place. 45
39.

See Doug Griffin, To End All Wars, DISSIDENT VOICE, http://dissid
entvoice.org/2012/07/to-end-all-wars/ (July 24, 2012) (describing how
Woodrow Wilson is most closely associated with the famous phrase
stemming from his speech to Congress on April 2, 1917).

40.

See President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Fireside Chat (Dec. 9, 1941)
(speaking to the American people about the “long war” ahead following
the attack on Pearl Harbor), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16056.

41.

See DAN REITER, HOW WARS END 1 (2009).

42.

World War 1 Ended with the Treaty of Versailles June 28, 1919,
AMERICA’S LIBRARY, http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/jazz/jb_jazz_
ww1_1.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).

43.

See Surrender of Italy Germany and Japan, World War II, Instruments
of Surrender, Public Papers and Addresses of the President, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess., DOC Y1.1/2 10949 (Oct. 4, 1946), at 3, 39–44, 107.

44.

See Yasir Ghazi & Rod Nordland, Iraq Insurgents Kill at Least 100 in
Cascade of Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2012, at A4 (setting forth
details of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s recent attacks in the ongoing insurgency);
US Would Not ‘Admit’ the Insurgency in Post-War Iraq, BBC (Dec. 15,
2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/mobile/uk_news/politics/8412317.stm.

45.

Guy Chazan, Insurgency Rises in Northern Ireland, WALL ST. J., (Feb.
23, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487041881045
7583263160945250.html (describing how continued attacks undermine
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There is a path to victory for the United States in this war
against the transnational non-state actor al-Qaeda, even if every
member of al-Qaeda does not lay down his arms in surrender or
acknowledge defeat. There are four steps on this path to victory.
First, the United States and its allies must kill or capture the
senior al-Qaeda leadership. We are doing that. The point regarding
kill or capture is critical, as a state cannot have a policy that requires
it to kill an enemy who surrenders. 46 There must always be a
detention option available, which is why military detention must
remain a legitimate tool for use in this and future wars. 47 Drone
strikes are a principal tool being used to kill senior al-Qaeda
leadership who are not encountered directly on the traditional kinetic
battlefield and are a legitimate use of force under the law of armed
conflict. 48
Second, the United States and its allies must cut off al-Qaeda’s
methods of travel. We have been working with allies consistently on
this issue since September 11, 2001, through a vast array of terrorist
watch lists, which identify terrorists and prevent them from traveling,
particularly to areas where they may pose a threat to United States,
allied forces, or other personnel. 49
Third, the United States and its allies must cut off al-Qaeda’s
funding sources. We have been working with allies to freeze assets
associated with terrorism in banks around the world, while at the
same time creating new laws that criminalize financial support to

fragile peace process); see also Douglas Woodwell, The “Troubles” of
Northern Ireland: Civil Conflict in an Economically Well-Developed
State, in UNDERSTANDING CIVIC WAR 161, 178–79, 182 (Paul Collier &
Nicholas Sanbanis eds., 2005) (discussing the violence in Northern
Ireland).
46.

See Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention III].

47.

See id. art. 5 (providing for tribunals and detention in cases where
“doubt arise[s]” as to a person’s status).

48.

See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at
the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law,
(Mar. 25, 2010) available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remar
ks/139119.htm (setting forth the position that the drone strikes are a
legitimate use of force under the law of war).

49.

See, e.g., Sharing with International Partners, INFO. SHARING ENV’T,
http://ise.gov/sharing-international-partners (last visited Jan. 10, 2013)
(describing efforts to combat terrorism by facilitating the two-way flow
of information and terrorist watch-lists between the U.S. and its
international partners).
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terrorists. 50 The United Nations has called on countries to cut off
terrorist means and methods of travel, and their funding. 51
Lastly, the United States and NATO allies will have to continue
efforts to “win the peace” in Afghanistan and elsewhere through
continued counter-insurgency efforts, rehabilitation and reintegration
programs, and developmental assistance and funding. 52
Achieving these objectives will not make every member of alQaeda and their affiliated groups lay down their weapons, but it will
make their ability to act on a global scale in the way that they did on
9/11 and the years following much more difficult. They will become,
in essence, splintered or localized terrorist groups, with the ability to
certainly carry out harm and terrorist threats on a more localized
scale, but not on the same global scale on which al-Qaeda has
operated. As a result, they will be more similar to the other terrorist
groups in the world that the United States is currently not at war
with, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and FARC, despite the fact that alQaeda could continue to be a threat, as these groups have been for
decades and continue to be. 53 However, the organization will no longer
be a terrorist organization which behaves like a state actor engaged in
50.

See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, TERRORIST FINANCING 28 (2008),
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/F
ATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Report.pdf
(recommending that countries “develop and implement targeted
financial sanctions regimes that identify, freeze the assets of, and
prohibit making funds necessary to deprive terrorists and their support
networks without delay”).
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FOREIGN RELATIONS, (Apr. 4, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/international-c
rime/tracking-down-terrorist-financing/p10356. See generally FINANCIAL
ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 50, at 27–31.

52.

See Major General Phil Jones, Reintegration & Reconciliation, COIN
COMMON SENSE, Jan. 2011, at 1, available at https://ronnaafghan.harmonieweb.org/CAAT/Shared%20Documents/COIN%20Com
mon%20Sense%20Issue%206.pdf (describing the Afghanistan Peace and
Reintegration Program’s purpose to “bring former fighters back to their
communities with honor and dignity so that they can live peaceful and
productive lives”).

53.

See, e.g., Terrorist Groups: Hamas, NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR.,
http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/hamas.html (last visited Jan. 10,
2013) (describing the localized terrorist group and its anti-Israel
attacks); Nicholas Kulish, Despite U.S. Fear Hezbollah Moves Openly in
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2012, at A1 (noting that some analysts
say Hezbollah “pose[s] less of a risk” than Al Qaeda); Sibylla
Brodzinsky, FARC and Colombian Government Launch Peace Talks,
THE GUARDIAN (UK), Oct. 18, 2012 http://www.guardian.co.uk/wo
rld/2012/oct/18/farc-colombian-government-peace-talks (reporting on
negotiations between the rebel forces and the Colombian government
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a military conflict, and as a result, the United States will no longer be
at war.
As a matter of law and policy, the United States has been at war
with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliates and associates
responsible for the attacks of 9/11. 54 The early policy statements of
the Bush Administration that we were in a “War on Terror” were
policy statements, rather than statements of a legal nature, 55 as the
war was always confined to the groups that “planned, authorized,
committed or aided” the 9/11 attacks as per the AUMF. 56 Some have
argued that both the Bush and Obama Administrations have fairly
liberally interpreted this authority. 57 It is the “warlike” characteristic
of al-Qaeda’s attack and the AUMF that supported the U.S. response
that gave both administrations the legitimacy that they did have to
treat members of these forces as enemy combatants, killing them on
the battlefield and in other types of targeted strikes. When al-Qaeda
is no longer behaving like a military enemy, we should continue to
treat them as we treat other terrorist groups around the world—using
traditional methods of law enforcement.
Achieving this military victory over al-Qaeda has another
extremely significant implication for the United States. It will have to
begin an orderly drawdown of the detainees remaining at
Guantanamo Bay, consistent with the international law of war. 58 In
Iraq, during 2008–2009, the United States was able to drawdown
nearly 25,000 detainees predominantly from the facilities in Camp
Bucca and Camp Cropper over the course of about eighteen months
54.

See Authorization for the Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 170th
Cong. § 2 (2001) (enacted) [hereinafter AUMF] (granting the President
authority to use all “necessary and appropriate force” against those
whom he determined “planned, authorized, committed or aided” the
attacks of September 11).

55.

John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism, 8 GER.
L.J. 735, 738 (2007) (“We do not believe we are in a legal state of war
with every terrorist group everywhere in the world.”).

56.

AUMF, supra note 54, § 2.

57.

See Emptywheel, John Bellinger: If the War is Illegal, Just Change the
Law, FIREDOGLAKE, (Nov. 27, 2010, 7:05 AM) http://emptywheel.fired
oglake.com/2010/11/27/john-bellinger-if-the-war-is-illegal-just-changethe-law (arguing that Republicans are seeking “more and more war
powers”); see also Jonathan Masters, Revisiting
a
Stale
Counterterrorism Law, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, (Sep. 1, 2011)
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/revisiting-stale-counterterrorismlaw/p25742 (John Bellinger commented that “it is becoming increasingly
difficult for the Obama administration to justify some of its
counterterrorism operations under this limited statutory authority”).

58.

See Geneva Convention III, supra note 46, art. 118 (“Prisoners of war
shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of
active hostilities.”).
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as the conflict was ending. 59 While it was a challenging process, it was
achieved in an orderly and timely manner consistent with the laws of
war. There are some people that would argue that we should keep the
detainees at Guantanamo Bay locked away forever, or at least as long
as one or every one of these detainees poses a threat to us. 60 The
detainees at Guantanamo Bay are not being held under a security
detention framework, which would make their individual threat level
relevant to an individualized determination. Instead, they are held
under the law of war, so when that war is over, they must be
repatriated or released. 61 They may be tried for crimes they
committed during the war, either at military commissions, Article III
courts, or by host nations. 62 Unless some new security detention
framework is developed, which seems unlikely at present, the
detainees who have not been tried and convicted must be repatriated
or released consistent with every other war in history.

IV. Conclusion
Professor Goldsmith has offered a plausible and realistic
explanation for how President Obama ended up not just inheriting,
but perpetuating, the same detention policies as the Bush
Administration. Fortunately for President Obama, Guantanamo Bay
has started to fade into the background noise and did not even
surface in this past year’s presidential election as an issue. It is hard
to argue, however, that the net effect of the detention policies from
the last ten years has left us with a stronger executive when it comes
to detention issues. The two other branches of government have
weighed in heavily to assert their view on how the executive should
use battlefield detention in the ongoing conflict with al-Qaeda and in
so doing have eroded the role of the executive branch. More decisive
national security decision-making processes, and perhaps, a media and
external audience that was as kind to President Bush on detention
issues as it is to President Obama could have mitigated this effect.
59.
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mo/index.html) (arguing Guantanamo Bay is necessary for “keeping
[terrorists] off the battlefield and allowing for lawful interrogations”).
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However, in the literature that ultimately captures this period in
time, there may be a storyline that shows how two strong but
different presidents both agreed in the end that military detention has
to be a critical tool in our fight against al-Qaeda—at least if we hope
to win. And we can win this war. To believe that this is a war
without end is to admit defeat from the start, and this author believes
we are nearing the endgame. Echoing the famous line from
Casablanca, “we will always have Guantanamo” has been heard in the
halls of Washington. The reality is we will always have the legacy of
Guantanamo Bay, but the detainees who we do not try at some point
will be long gone before the “reasonable drawdown” period after we
win this war with al-Qaeda.
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